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Non-dualistic thinking in mesology （fûdogaku）
Nobuo Kioka
Introduction
 There are three types of mesology : the mesology of Tetsurô Watsuji 
（1889-1960）, of Augustin Berque （1942-）, and of myself, Nobuo Kioka 
（1951-）. To begin this article１）, I would like to explain the three forms, 
noting the differences among them as simply as possible, since this is not the 
central issue of this essay, in which I wish to reflect mainly on the problem 
of high technology today. For this reason, I will concentrate on clarifying 
the indispensability of non-dualistic thinking in this highly techno-governed 
world. I therefore divide my essay into three parts, as follows ─1） I will 
try to make clear the significance of mesology, as shown by the different 
versions above, then 2） I will introduce my theoretical standpoint, which 
I call the ＂logic of the form＂（かたちの論理）, focusing on its non-dualistic 
aspects, and finally, 3） I will apply it to the problem of technology today.
1  Three types of mesology （fûdogaku）
Different standpoints
 The term “mesology” means the “study of milieu” in its original form in 
French ‘mésologie’. However, I prefer here to use a Japanese word fûdogaku 
（風土学） instead of  employing the term “mesology”. Fûdogaku has a two-
fold meaning as follows ─ a） prototype of the mesology invented by Augustin 
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Berque who received inspiration from Watsuji２）, founder of fûdogaku in 
Japan, and b） revised version of the theory proposed by myself following 
the road opened by these two predecessors. Now I will boldly say that I 
prefer the term fûdogaku to “mesology” in the need to put an accent on 
certain elements that are lacking in them both. My own theory of fûdogaku 
is different from both Watsuji’s and Berque’s mesology. To make distinct 
the difference among the three of us, I must begin by trying to outline the 
standpoint of Watsuji.
Watsuji’s fûdogaku
 Augustin Berque called Watsuji one of two forerunners of his mesology. 
（The other is Uexküll [1864-1944], a well-known naturalist in Germany.） 
These two persons, according to Berque, posed the same problem: “How 
does reality appear to a given subject?”３）. The answer of one is “milieu” 
（fûdo）, of the other “Umwelt”, as is well known. Berque says that these 
notions refer to different objects ─ in the case of Watsuji, humans, in Uexküll, 
non-humans （animals in general）─ but what they have in common is their 
protest against the dualism of Cartesian tradition. Nevertheless, as regards 
Uexküll, from my viewpoint, he remained attached to epistemological 
dualism, despite his decisive anti-anthropocentric stance. Proposing a multi-
dimensional dualism covering all animal species, he showed himself as none 
other than a successor of Descartes, like every scientist in modern times, 
without exception.
 How about Watsuji, who studied the phenomenology of the day in 
Germany? His notion of fûdo （milieu）, emphasizing the meaning of indivisible 
connection between humankind and nature, obviously opposes the “Subject 
-Object” schema of dualism. I must say, however, that this anti-dualistic 
attitude did not come from phenomenology, ─ in essence, dualism itself,
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─ but from the Asian tradition of Buddhism. Watsuji in his younger days 
started his academic career from the study of early Buddhism４）. Under the 
description in Fûdo （風土）, 1935, one can perceive a trace of the idea of kû 
（空 śūnya; emptiness） which insists on the oneness of two things apparently 
divided, or their relation as being “neither identical, nor different” （fuitsu-fui 
［不一不異］） as formulated in the introduction of Mãdyamakakãrikã （Chûron
［中論］） drawn up by Nãgãrjuna （Ryûju 龍樹 , 150?-250?）. This is the very 
idea of the indivisible tie between humans and nature conceived by Watsuji 
with the notion of fûdo. This idea is typically Buddhistic ─ , in other words 
non-dualistic ─ , which had never been found before in its explicit form in 
Western history of thoughts since ancient Greece５）.
Berque’s encounter with Japan
 Augustin Berque was deeply shocked by the strangeness of Japanese 
culture in his first visit to Japan in 1969. For example, he called its eminent 
characteristics “lococentrism”６） for the lack of grammatical subjects in 
everyday conversation. This lococentrism, seen generally in Japanese life and 
culture, taught him uselessness of the ‘S-O’ schema which he had believed to 
be universal until then. This fact opened his eyes to a new world where the 
Cartesian dualism does not go without reserve. As regards this discovery 
happened during his fieldwork in Hokkaidô （北海道）, he wrote:
In a word, mediance７）objects to dualism. This non-dualism became 
evident to me little by little while studying on Hokkaidô, and next on 
Japan in general８）.
 Therefore, Berque had to set about making his own theory non-
dualistic. The task meant for him to overcome the Western tradition of 
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dualism in which he was born and had been brought up until then. Could 
such an attempt be hopeful? I think it is too hard to carry through, because 
such a task cannot but compel the agent to doubt or further deny the 
backbone of his personality, formed with his cultural milieu. Nevertheless, 
he accomplished this difficult work９）, the result of which, I think, was a 
revolutionary method of thinking never seen in the Western history of ideas. 
He called this new method “trajection”10）.
Trajection: A revision of dualism
 Why do I think it is revolutionary? The method of trajection is the 
alpha-and-omega of his mesology. Its essential point consists in the “go-
return” process between two poles ─ : for example, “idealism-realism”, 
“subjectivism-objectivism”, or “dualism-non-dualism”. This process implies 
two actions that are utterly opposite （or rather, contradictory）: i.e., the 
double negation of A and non-A, or the double affirmation of A and non-A11）. 
Is this understandable for everyone? I think it is scarcely comprehensible 
for those who only live in the world of formal logic, perhaps for all the 
people in the Western world. Through the process of trajection one is led 
at first to dualism, implied in the system of formal logic12）, in which A and 
non-A are incompatible, next to non-dualism. Transition between two poles 
（A-non-A） goes on in such a manner without stopping at either of the two 
positions．One might say, therefore, that the process of trajection implies not 
only “double negation” but also “double affirmation” as to the two opposites. 
Is this thinking style “logical”? No, it is by no means logical, as far as this 
term means the thinking manner originated from the Greek logos. Berque 
then established the idea of ‘trajection’ as being close the Indian classic logic 
or “lemmic”13） （this also is derived from a Greek word, lemma, meaning 
“intuitional knowledge”）, an alternative to “logic”.
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 In early years of the 21st century, Berque had contact by chance with 
the lemmic, guided by a Japanese book Logos and Lemma14）. The encounter 
with this book caused him great astonishment at the affinity between his 
own idea of trajection and the Indian classic logic called the lemmic. This 
raised in me the question: “The lemmic, perhaps a unique manner of thinking 
in east Asia, is it also applicable to the Western world?” As regards this 
question, Berque, for his part, has replied positively by introducing lemmic 
thinking partially into his theory of mesology15）. As for me, I am willing to 
pursue the path once opened by the author of Logos and Lemma, Tokuryû 
Yamanouchi, who called his mission “the synthesis of the Eastern and the 
Western logical thoughts” （東西論理思想の総合）, aiming at the goal where a 
genuine encounter between two worlds will be established.
 I noted at the beginning of this discussion that there are three types of 
mesology: Watsuji’s, Berque’s, and mine. Then, before introducing my theory 
of fûdogaku, the “logic of the form” （katachi no ronri ［かたちの論理］）, I 
think I should make a brief account of my theoretical standpoint and how it 
differs from Berque’s mesology and Watsuji’s fûdogaku.
Kioka’s fûdogaku
 Learning from two grand masters preceding me in this academic fields, 
mesology （fûdogaku） on my side has been transfigured into a new version 
that should be regarded as substantially original. I would therefore like 
to clarify the differences between our approaches. As for my discipline of 
fûdogaku, it should be regarded as a variant version to be distinguished from 
both Berque’s mesology and Watsuji’s fûdogaku, so I think I must introduce 
it from now on as an utterly different type of mesology （fûdogaku）.
 What, then, are the differences between their disciplines and mine? I 
must note several viewpoints of my theory never seen in theirs. Among 
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them, I start with the “decentralisation-recentralisation” approach, devised 
to explain the encounter with strange milieus. One can understand it through 
the cases of Watsuji and Berque in their experiences abroad. On the one 
hand, Watsuji’s fûdogaku was created because of his experiences abroad, 
particularly through information on the various milieus he encountered by 
himself during his voyage to Europe for study abroad16）. This is typically 
an example of his “decentralisation” （脱中心化） caused by encounters 
by chance with milieus other than his milieu （viz.Japan）. His text Fûdo 
could never have been written if he had remained in his country. On the 
other hand, the approach developed in this book describes another process 
of mesological experience, “recentralisation” （再中心化）, forming a pair 
with “decentralisation”. However, here I cannot deepen this into complete 
system of “decentralisation-recentralisation”. For the moment, I will 
restrict my concern to indicate only two facts as follows: 1） the dynamic 
process in Watsuji forced an invention of a unique method of “analogy” 
that makes it possible to compare between different milieus, for example 
“monsoon”, “desert”, and “pasture”, as seen in the description of chapter 2 
of Fûdo. 2） Berque reached his idea of trajection through his experience of 
“decentralisation-recentralisation”.
 However, it may not be necessary to go into the case of Berque, since 
the inspiration of his method of trajection which came to him through his 
encounter with Japan and Japanese culture, as explained above, offers us the 
strongest model of the process of “decentralisation-recentralisation” as he 
experienced it. So I want to set about introducing another theoretical point of 
my fûdogaku, the “logic of the form” （katachi no ronri ［かたちの論理］）.
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2  The “logic of the form”
Two moments: katachi and kata
 I present the “logic of the form” as an appropriate example to criticize 
the standpoints of science and technology founded by Cartesian dualism. The 
logic of the form, I think, has its origin in the East Asian tradition of ideas, 
covering India, China, Korea, and Japan. This means the Buddhistic tradition 
is non-Occidental. Here I must adhere to Japanese terminology, and make 
a distinction between katachi （かたち［形］, form） and kata （かた［型］, style; 
paradigm）17）.
 One can find the original form of this non-dualistic thinking in the notion 
of ‘kū’（［空］, śūnya emptiness）, invented by Nãgãrjuna in Mãdyamakakãrikã 
（6th century CE） as mentioned above. In this text are found “eight 
negations”（happu ［八不］, four sets of double negation）, one of which is 
named “fuitsu-fui”（［不一不異］, neither identical, nor different）. Perhaps this 
phrase sounds too strange to us, as it does to me who has learned the logic 
of Western philosophy, because such a form of double negation obviously 
surpasses the law of contradiction of the formal logic working in our daily 
life.
 What does the “emptiness” （kū）, or “neither identical, nor different” 
mean? To answer this question, I must begin with an explanation of dualism. 
The gist of dualism consists in regarding two things as to be divided in 
order that they could not be reunified as they were. The two things thus 
divided cannot but be independent of each other in such a way that there 
could not be the middle between them; e.g. “mind-body”, “subject-object”, 
“self-other”, etc. This is due to the third law of formal logic: the “law of 
excluded-middle”. On the contrary, the standpoint of “emptiness” admits the 
“middle” between divided two terms, since, according to Buddhistic logic or 
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the lemmic, there should be interdependent relationships among all things in 
the world18）. The lemmic, opposing formal logic, insists on the reality of the 
middle of two things definable as “neither identical nor different”. It admits 
the milieu against the “law of excluded middle”, which denies “between-
ness” on the ground of dualistic thinking. Therefore, the lemmic is, in this 
sense, nothing but the “logic of the middle”19）.
 However, I must stop from going further into such a logical subject, 
since I must focus on the “logic of the form”, that is the problem of the 
“katachi （form）-kata （style）” relationship. Is there any possibility of non-
dualistic or lemmic thinking in the “logic of the form”? For my part, I would 
say “Yes”, and here is my reason.
Inseparable ties of the two moments
 Between the two moments, katachi and kata, a process of mutual 
adaptation occurs. On the one hand, kata shows itself as a model to be 
followed by katachi; in other words, kata produces various katachi. On the 
other hand, katachi follows kata ready-made, and finally becomes kata itself. 
The preceding kata is then substituted by the following katachi. Thus, kata 
and katachi change their places in turn in an utterly different manner from 
the Western model of production based on traditional dualism20）, where 
the position of a God-like principle （producer） and its result （product） is 
definitively fixed. 
 Here we can see two contrasting models of production, the one dualistic 
and the other non-dualistic. The latter, of course, is of the “logic of the form”. 
And the former, I believe, is the greatest source of environmental crisis 
today21）. I would like to propose the “logic of the form” as an alternative for 
this ancient model derived from Cartesian dualism. 
 On the ground of non-dualistic thinking, kata and katachi constitute 
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relations non-exclusive to each other, since an exchangeable relation 
exists between the two terms in a way never seen in the case of dualistic 
production. As for kata, its status is relatively unlike the absolute “principle” 
in dualism. Then, what is the difference between kata and katachi? One 
should note that the suffix chi is lacking in ‘kata’. Chi in kata-chi means 
chikara （［力］, power）, ‘ikioi’ （［勢い］, puissance or might）22）. Kata therefore 
shows us a state of katachi （form） lacking power or puissance. In other 
words, katachi can be regarded as kata （style） vivified with vital energy. So 
we could also define kata as sublimed katachi in exchange for the loss of its 
force. The former （kata） can characterize itself by its relative stability in 
contrast with the latter （katachi） marking its changeability.
 Despite its alikeness to “principle” based on dualism, kata should not 
be confused with “principle” whose status is utterly different from that of 
kata. The status of principle, bearing the function of “producer”, is fixed in 
an unchangeable manner in relation to the products brought about by their 
“producer”. Principle, in this context, distinguishes itself from products. Kata, 
on the contrary, presents itself as only a provisional model to be followed 
containing variability in relation to every katachi, which changes from one to 
other by their vivacity. In short, the correlation of kata-katachi is constantly 
reformed through the changes of its components （either or both of them）.
An example: A trick from jūdō
 We can understand the realities of this kind of correlation from certain 
examples. Cultural tradition in Japan offers many good examples of non-
dualistic production （reproduction） modelled on the “logic of the form”. 
One can easily find them in martial arts （jūdō 柔道 , karate 空手 , etc.）, or in 
traditional performance （kabuki 歌舞伎 , nō 能 , etc.）. I wish to take jūdō, a 
very popular sport in Korea as well as in Japan, as an appropriate case to 
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explain the “logic of the form”. 
 I suppose all Korean people are familiar to this sport, and further that 
many of them are fond of it. As they know, training in jūdō begins with 
learning kata, the paradigmatic style proper to every trick （seoinage 背負い
投げ， ōsotogari 大外刈り， etc.）. All beginners are told by their teachers to 
observe kata faithfully, so as not to deviate from it.
 Thus, I would like to pose a question like this: “Does kata mean an 
absolute model for every jūdō player?” The answer is ‘yes’, in one sense, but 
‘no’, in another ─ I cannot but answer this question in such an ambiguous 
manner. Why ‘yes’, then? Simply because one cannot master any trick of jūdō 
without kata as guideline. If so, why would one answer “no” to the same 
question? Because of the indispensable condition with which kata does its 
work ─ it is the cooperation of kata and katachi. For example, kata can vary, as 
various katachi are practiced by different players in different places. There 
cannot exist any kata without a katachi that specifies or localizes the kata. 
And for this very reason, the normative sense of kata is not absolute but 
relative. In other words, as a dualistic relation between two divided terms 
cannot be realized, the theory of the dualism cannot but fall invalidated here.
 To prove this truth, I want to take an example of the jūdō trick seoinage 
（［背負い投げ］, to throw your opponent over your shoulder）. This trick 
depends on the cooperation of two hands, hikite （［引き手］, the pulling hand） 
and tsurite （［釣り手］, the lifting hand）. Thus, textbooks of jūdō teach us the 
necessity of cooperation of the two hands distinguished according to their 
roles to play. This means “standard” style of seoinage in Japan, where it was 
born and developed into the martial art jūdō. However, “standard” should 
not be regarded as “absolute”. As everyone knows, jūdō, through the process 
of diffusion into the world, has brought about great variations in style in 
every region. Almost all countries have their own kata of jūdō today and 
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Korea is no exception. The Korean style of seoinage is unique concerning the 
use of two hands: hikite and tsurite work in unity without a clear distinction 
between them as “standard” （or Japanese） style requires. So, there exists an 
obvious difference of style between Korea and Japan. I  hastily add that this 
does not matter that one is right and the other is wrong ─ only that there 
are local differences in kata23）.
 Here we can acknowledge an example of the Buddhistic “neither 
identical nor different” explained above, because the two terms（kata and 
katachi） are tied inextricably to another; i.e., “neither one nor two” （fuitsu-
funi ［不一不二］）.
3  Criticizing high-technology today
Impasse of dualistic technology
 I regret that I cannot but addresse the problems of technology today 
only slightly because my knowledge in this field is limited. I only want to 
do one thing here, but it is fatal for this problem; to question “How do we 
get out of the impasse into which our highly techno-governed society has 
strayed?” Before answering immediately, I must present an overview of 
how technology has been influenced by modern dualistic thinking. The 
situation now seems too paradoxical to me who takes a critical stance against 
Cartesian dualism. Technology traditionally based on the dualism has lost 
in a maze that is forcing it to abandon the fundamental distinction of two 
polarities, e.g., “spirit-body”, “thought-extension” or “real-ideal”. These 
dichotomies have long been believed with their resulting practical uses since 
the age of the Enlightenment, because without them modern technology 
could not have attained its aim, that is, mass production as determined by 
the needs of the consumer. Modern civilization in this context flourished 
exclusively in the Western world because of dualism’s generalized thinking. 
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This historical process has been promoted by the “logic of desire” as I will 
call it. I will give you some examples to clarify the paradoxical situation 
around technology today.
 Among the problems, the most typical case is in robotics. There is 
an enterprise in Japan to pursue an aim to fabricate androids that are not 
only similar to human, but “equal” to the person who posed as its model24）. 
This unprecedented project, I think, relies on the belief that the distinction 
between two substances, res cogitans （human） and res extensa （machine; 
robot） once established by Descartes, could be, or should be, dissolved. It 
seems that engineers of robotics have annulled this principle, the starting 
point of their technical practice. I know nothing more ridiculous than this !
 Another example: the confusion of virtual reality（VR） with reality 
itself. The notion of “virtual” depends on its radical difference with “real”
（and is not virtual）. Most of the amusement from innovative devices in 
this field comes from the essential distinction between “real” and “virtual”. 
Technological development has created a situation in which the real and 
the virtual seem equivalent. No matter how nearly VR may approach to the 
reality, however, there exists an undeniable barrier between them, one that 
is impossible to surmount. This barrier was established by dualism due to 
which engineers have been able to work.
 The two examples above show us a situation in which technology is now 
caught in a trap of its own making. What caused such auto-contradictory 
affairs? I would say the controlling influence of dualistic thinking. But this is 
too simple an answer to such a complicated problem. To completely explain 
the conflict of technology with the natural sciences since the beginning of the 
modern era, I cannot but mention psychological mechanism that rules over 
every human in unseen ways. I would like to call this mechanism the “logic 
of desire”（欲望の論理）.
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The logic of desire
 What is the “logic of desire”?25） It is not the subconscious impulse that 
usually associated with the word “desire”, but a form of so-called logic 
that is based on human reasoning. That leads me to immediately pose 
two questions. 1） Why is this “logic” not a simple instinctive drive usually 
associated with the word “desire”? 2） In what manner is the “logic of 
desire” linked to “reason”?
 “Desire” in the ordinary sense is connected with blind vital energy, like 
the Freudian libido. But desire is not the same thing as vial energy, since 
to establish a link between mind and body, there must be some cultural 
mediation. I would rather say that desire is an unconscious energy promoted 
by the mediation of dualistic thinking working at a conscious level in cultural 
fields. So, there would be a cooperation of consciousness over two levels 
of mind, one explicit and the other implicit. The explicit consciousness, 
that is, dualistic thinking divides object from subject （agent） to establish a 
domination of the former by the latter. The desire is materialized through 
this psychological process to develop endlessly. I must emphasize that 
dualistic thinking, as well as libido, could not be defined by itself as the cause 
of desire. Conscious thinking （dualism） and unconscious energy, inseparably 
united with the appearance of ‘half-logic’, would play their respective roles in 
this process called “the logic of desire”. 
 Then let us move on to the second question. Dualistic thinking regards 
two terms （“subject-object”） as independent. One cannot confuse one with 
the other, proving a victory of reason. And one cannot find any problem 
in this dichotomy itself. “Reason”, however, has overlooked until now the 
existence of a trap of “desire”, hidden under its foot. Of course the link 
between the conscious and subconscious levels is invisible, but could be 
picked up so that we realize it as a kind of logic and try to surpass it. This 
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is why I insist on applying “logic” to this obscure mechanism of “desire”. 
“Logic” here signifies for me “an operation of the mind, to take something 
out of the darkness and put it under the control of reason”. Needless to say, 
this has nothing to do with so-called logic possessed exclusively by logicians 
living in their logical world.
Conclusion
 Innovative technologies （e.g., AI ［artificial intelligence］, VR, robotics, 
etc.） are all founded on dualistic thinking. No “middle” between divided two 
polarized terms can exist, as shown by the algorithm of computer science, 
the binary numeration of 0 and 1. This explains the domination of the 
“principle of excluded middle”. It is the result of two terms being perfectly 
divided: one, a god-like principle and the other, uniform products. As far as 
it concerns the relation of the two terms, it somewhat resembles katachi 
（form）-kata （style）, but in fact they are polar opposites. 
 Why do I think so? Kata, producing various katachi, is renewed or 
substituted by katachi, so it is marked by its flexibility. It therefore differs 
from the absolute principle ruling dualistic technology. As I noted above, the 
god-like principle accompanying dualism proves the presence of the “logic 
of desire”. It is the desire with which dualism has marched through modern 
times until now. So, to conclude this essay, I must confirm the task left to 
us. It is to show the applicability of the “logic of the form” to the problem of 
technology today. This task means to reply to the questions: “How can we 
overcome the ‘logic of the desire’?” and “How can we apply the ‘logic of the 
form’ to highly developed technology today?”
Note
１） For the purpose of participating an international workshop named “Politics of 
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Milieu Today”, （Seoul 9-10 May）, I prepared a paper for my presentation （40 minutes 
allotted） under the same title as this article. This is a revised version augmented with 
several points that were omitted from the paper because of the time restriction.
２） Watsuji, in his time, used the term fûdogaku （風土学） for the German ‘Klimatologie 
（climatology）’, because he learned this discipline during his study in Germany （1927－
1928）, where the Kilmatologie since Herder （1744-1803） was still keeping its vigour
（we acknowledge its traces in the notion of Umwelt in Uexkull or in early Heidegger）. 
I must add hastily that mesology distinguishes itself by its non-dualistic posture from 
climatology which is in essence dualistic. Nevertheless, Watsuji’s fûdogaku meant the 
non-dualistic relationship between human beings and nature and Berque got great 
impetus from it to establish his new theory of milieu that he called mésologie.
３） «Comment la réalité apparaît-elle concrètement à un sujet donné?» （La mésologie, 
pourquoi et pour quoi faire, Presses universitaires de Paris Ouest, 2014, p.50. Japanese 
edition : Fûdogaku wa naze nanno tameni （風土学はなぜ 何のために）, tr.by Nobuo Kioka 
（木岡伸夫）, Osaka, Kansai Univ. Press, 2019, p.61.
４） His doctoral thesis（1926） was later published under the title The philosophy of 
practice in primitive Buddhism （Genshi Bukkyô no Jissen Tetsugaku ［原始仏教の実践哲
学］, 和辻哲郎全集第五巻）, Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1962.
５） I especially keep in mind Plato’s fundamental dualism of real － ideal’.
６） Concerning the term “lococentrism” （場所中心主義）, see Vivre l’espace au Japon, 
Paris, PUF, 1982 ; Japanese edition : Kūkan no nihon-bunka （空間の日本文化）, tr. by 
Makoto Miyahara （宮原 信）, Tokyo, Chikuma Gakugei Bunko, 1994 （1985）.
７） A translation of the Japanese term fûdosei （風土性）.
８） La mésologie, pourquoi et pour quoi faire, p.39 ; Japanes edition, p.42 （cf. note 3）.
９） I called such a behaviour “decentralization”（脱中心化） in my fûdogaku, as a compo-
nent of correlative process “decentralization-recentralization”. In this regard, please 
refer to my book Deai no fûdogaku （出会いの風土学）, Tokyo, Gentōsha, 2018, pp.94-
106. In passing, I heard from Berque that the French version, translated by him will be 
published in 2019.
10） Japanese translation: tsûtaika （通態化）。
11） Two phrases express respectively the 3rd and 4th lemma of the tetralema formulated 
by Yamanouchi （see note14）.
12） Aristotelian formal logic consists of three principles: 1） the law of identity, 2） the law 
of contradiction, and 3） the law of excluded middle.
13） I have pointed out to him by e-mail the similarity of his idea of trajection to lemmic 
thinking, which he had not been very familiar with until then. To this message, he 
replied “Yes”. He now affirms that “meso-logic is lemmic”.
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14） Tokuryû Yamanouchi （山内得立）, Logos and Lemma （ロゴスとレンマ）, 1974, Tokyo, 
Iwanami Shoten.
15） See Chap. Ⅵ-Ⅶ in La mésologie...
16） Forty days’ sailing, stopping at many ports along the route, awakened in him 
an interest in the problems concerning the “spatiality of the structure of human 
existence”（人間存在の構造の空間性）, This experience, which he called “impressions 
on various milieus”（さまざまの風土の印象）, united with another motivation to protest 
to Heidegger’s attachment to ‘temporality’ in Sein und Zeit just published in 1927, 
encouraged him to make his own theory of milieu. Concerning these points, see the 
Preface（序言） of Fûdo （風土）, Iwanami-bunko, 1979.
17） Chinese characters （kanji） are often confused in practical use. For example, in 
the case of karate 空手， ［形］ is read as kata, not as katachi. As kata and katachi are 
originally Japanese, not Chinese, distinguishing between kanji 形 and 型 is only for 
convenience. 
18） This relationship is called en （縁） （pratyaya, Buddhistic connection）. To my regret, 
however, I can touch on this important notion only briely. 
19） “The principle of included middle” （in French, “le principe du tiers inclu”） is a target 
of multi-valued logic today. I note only the name of the founder of this logic, Stéphane 
Lupasco （Stephan Lupascu, 1900-1988）, a Romanian philosopher, who came to Paris to 
diffuse his own logic, but in vain. French people, fundamentally dualistic, rejected his 
new logical device.
20） Here I would recall Platonic dualism （the distinction between idea and the actual 
world） rather than its modern version, Cartesian dualism, which is derived from the 
former, its prototype. See note 5.
21） This is, needless to say, one-sided opinion. However, I do not have the space to 
discuss the merits and demerits of dualism in this paper.
22） See Yûjirô Nakamura （中村雄二郎）, Katachi no Odhissei （Odyssey of the Form）, 
Tokyo, Iwanami shoten, 1991, p.68.
23） Regarding this topic in May 2019, I referred to Youtube which was preparing to 
show videos prohibiting the Korean style of seoinage probably because of the reason of 
danger.
24） These androids are named “Ishiguroid 1”, “Ishiguroid 2”, and so on, after their creator 
Hiroshi Ishiguro （石黒 浩）, special professor at Osaka University.
25） On this subject, I have written several essays in Japanese that have been published in 
a book focused on the topic, Kaikō no ronri （［邂逅の論理］, The logic of the Encounter）, 
Tokyo, Shunjūsha, 2017. See Chapter 1: “Why should the “encounter” be treated as 
subject?”（邂逅がなぜ問題になるのか）, and Chapter 3: “Questioning the logic” （論理への問い）.
